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Abstract: The recent euro area crisis shows some similarities with the fixed
exchange rate crisis that affected the European Monetary System in 1992–93. I
argue that the theoretical framework to be used in order to analyze them should
also be similar. As a matter of fact, in both cases, the point of view of the
government (that compares costs and benefits of its action) should be consid-
ered together with the point of view of speculators, who look at the state of the
economic fundamentals in order to decide whether to launch an attack or not.
This allows to represent and to interpret, among other things, both the initial
“honeymoon” years of EMU and the recent euro area crisis.
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1 Introduction
The recent euro area crisis1 shows some similarities with the one that affected
the European Monetary System (EMS) in the years 1992–93.
In both cases economists and analysts have been wondering whether the
reasons of the crisis had to be found in the weak “fundamentals” of the
countries whose assets have been subject to attack (currencies in the first
case, government bonds in the second one) or in the role played by self-fulfilling
expectations, or maybe in a combination of both.
A parallel between the two crises can also be drawn by considering the
literature on speculative attacks on fixed exchange rates that emerged in the
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1 For a deep analysis of the reasons behind the euro area crisis see Rehman (2015).
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1990s in order to interpret the latter. According to that literature, it is possible to
distinguish three regions of the state of domestic economic fundamentals: a
region of absolute strength of economic fundamentals, in which the exchange
rate remains fixed and cannot be subject to confidence crises;2 a region of
absolute weakness in which, even in the absence of speculation, the domestic
currency is certainly devalued by the central bank due to the low level of its
economic fundamentals; and an intermediate, “gray” area (in which economic
fundamentals are neither too weak nor too strong), characterized by a multi-
plicity of exchange rate equilibria, depending on the state of expectations.
The recent euro area crisis can be interpreted along similar lines, although
with two main obvious differences.
First of all, the speculative behavior of financial markets focuses on the
public debt of sovereign countries, rather than on fixed exchange rates.3
Second, the public authority that confronts the private sector is the govern-
ment, rather than the central bank. As a matter of fact, while in the speculative
attacks on fixed exchange rates the central bank has to decide whether to
devalue or not (by comparing costs and benefits of pegging the exchange
rate), in this second case it is the government that has to take an optimal
decision, namely whether it should renege or not on the public debt, by compar-
ing the costs and the benefits of a default.
2 In a situation of full and complete information, and in which markets behave rationally and
are not subject to panic, myopia or a wrong state of expectations, nobody of course would be
selling a currency at a price which would be lower than the “shadow” one resulting from the
correct evaluation of its economic fundamentals, as it is correctly recognized in the literature. It
should be acknowledged, however, that information is not always full and complete and
markets do not always behave rationally, but may be subject to euphoria, panic, perception
biases or any other “emotional behavior”, as I would define it, like for example the “irrational
exuberance” described by Shiller (2005). If that is the case, then, the area of stability may get
smaller (in the case of negatively biased expectations) or larger (in the case of positively biased
expectations), even for long periods of time.
3 One of the motivations of the creation of a monetary union was precisely the need to avoid
the exchange rate instability of fixed exchange rate systems that may still be subject to
confidence and credibility crises, even when the exchange rate peg is declared as “irrevocable”.
The recent euro area crisis, however, shows that speculation did not disappear but simply
changed objective, by moving from sovereign currencies to sovereign debts. The exit of any of
the countries adopting the euro, however (during Spring 2015 the exit of Greece was considered
by the media as a possible event), would change all this and the euro area might end up looking
like an imperfectly credible fixed exchange rate regime rather than a monetary union. This also
explains why the Maastricht Treaty did not contain any indication of the possibility for a
country to leave EMU once it adhered to it.
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Another, more significant, difference is due to the fact that while in analyz-
ing speculative attacks against fixed exchange rates the state of the economic
fundamentals is usually considered as objectively determined and given, in the
case of attacks against public debt the state of expectations affects the level of
the interest rate, and may therefore change the state of economic fundamentals.
Apart from those differences, however, I argue that in the case of speculative
attacks against government debt it is also possible to identify three separate
regions – one of stability, one of instability and an intermediate “gray” region –
as in the case of speculative attacks against fixed exchange rates.
The rest of the article is composed as follows. Section 2 reviews briefly the
literature on speculative attacks on fixed exchange rates, Section 3 presents the
model of speculative attacks on government debt, Section 4 proposes an inter-
pretation of the euro area crisis, and Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
2 First and Second Generation Models
of Speculative Attacks on Fixed Exchange Rates
According to the literature on speculative attacks on fixed exchange rates, it is
possible to distinguish three regions of the state of domestic economic
fundamentals.4
The three regions emerge as a synthesis of two different interpretations of
speculative attacks in fixed exchange rate systems resulting from two different
“generations” of literature.
The first one is based on the role played by economic fundamentals, consid-
ered by homogeneous speculators in deciding whether to attack or not the currency
(theywill attack as soon as the state of fundamentals exceeds a stability threshold).
In this first approach, initiated by Krugman (1979) and simplified by Flood and
Garber (1984), currency crises come as a result of some (exogenous) divergent
policy followed by the monetary authority. In these models the current exchange
rate (e) is assumed to be a function of the current state of the economic funda-
mentals (θ) and of the expected future variation of the exchange rate itself ( _ee).
4 It should be recognized, however, that the actual state of “economic fundamentals”, can
hardly be considered an objectively measurable index. It is rather a subjectively weighted index
composed by an equally subjectively determined number of macroeconomic indicators, includ-
ing public debt/GDP ratio, public deficit/GDP ratio, current account/GDP ratio, and many other
potentially relevant macroeconomic variables and indicators. See Cheli and Della Posta (2007)
for further details.
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Moreover, it is assumed that the private sector forms its expectations in a
rational way and it is able to check whether the current money supply and the
future expected variation of it are consistent with the central bank’s commitment
to a fixed exchange rate (e). In order to do so, speculators compare the latter with
the ‘shadow’ exchange rate (~e) that they expect to prevail in a free float regime.
As soon as the state of the “fundamental” variable represented by money crea-
tion increases to a level that is expected to be incompatible with the pegging of
the exchange rate, the private sector, by taking into due account the transaction
cost (t), reacts in order to avoid the losses resulting from an unanticipated
devaluation, and the central bank is forced to abandon the parity even before
the natural exhaustion of foreign reserves. There exists, then, a unique critical
level for the economic fundamental below which everybody attacks the currency
and above which nobody does it. This is represented by Figure 1 below.
The second approach is based instead on the role played by self-fulfilling
expectations, when the central bank compares costs and benefits of the defense
of the fixed exchange rate and devalues if the former exceed the latter.
In this second approach, corresponding to the “second generation” of cur-
rency crises models, speculative attacks arise because of self-fulfilling expecta-
tions: given that the central bank’s optimal policy is determined endogenously, if
all speculators attack the currency (namely if a proportion of speculators equal to 1
sells it), the cost for the central bank of defending the exchange rate parity will
certainly exceed the benefit of its defense so that the optimal decision for the
central bank will be to devalue, thereby validating in a self-fulfilling way the initial
negative expectation (prophecy) of speculators. However, there is a critical level at
which fundamentals are so weak (namely θ is so high), that even if no speculators
θ
e + t–
), ,(~ eee θ
e + t–
θ
–
Figure 1: The speculative attack occurs as soon as e+ t = ~eðθ, _eeÞ.
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attack (i. e. there is a 0 proportion of speculators attacking), the cost of the defense
will exceed the benefit of it, and the exchange rate will be devalued with certainty.
For values of θ > θ, then, there is instability for sure (see Figure 2 below).
While some of these second generation models seemed to prove that negative
shifts of expectations may cause the abandonment of a fixed exchange rate
system even in presence of sound fundamentals, either considering the role
played by foreign reserves (Obstfeld 1986) or referring to a costs-benefits analy-
sis (Bensaid and Jeanne 1997), other works re-established the role played by
fundamentals even within this approach: self-fulfilling speculative attacks can
only be successful when fundamentals are “weak”, that is when they are in the
unstable region, identified in the first generation models.
As a matter of fact, Obstfeld (1995, 1996), by merging the first and the
second generation of literature, proved the existence of three different regions
for the fundamentals of an economy (see Figure 3 below): (1) a region of
stability, for θ < θ (where θ indicates the lower critical level of the fundamental
as determined in the first generation of speculative attacks models), so that no
speculators have convenience to launch an attack on the currency since by
doing so they would lose money, and no devaluation takes place; (2) a region
of instability, for θ > θ, (where θ indicates the upper critical level of the funda-
mental, as determined in the second generation of speculative attack models), in
which θ is in such a bad state that the monetary authority finds too costly to
defend the parity even if nobody attacks, so that the currency will be devalued
with certainty; and (3) the so called “gray” region, for θ ≤ θ ≤ θ, where anything
can happen: the exchange rate will be maintained if only “few” speculators
attack, while the central bank will be obliged to devalue if a “high” proportion
C(θ, α)
B
θ
C(θ, 0)
C(θ, 1)
B
θ−
Figure 2: Central bank’s costs and benefits of fixing the exchange rate.
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of speculators attack (see Morris and Shin (1998) and Goldstein (2012) for a
similar graphical representation).
An attack against a currency, then, will only be successful if fundamentals are
“weak”. Thismeans that as soon as θ ≥ θ, the fixed exchange rate system is already
in a region of potential instability. However, the exchange rate will only collapse at
the critical value θ if all speculators join in the attack by coordinating their actions.
If they do notmanage to coordinate (or if not all of them are aware of the “true” bad
state of the fundamentals), the proportion of speculators attacking the currency
will be less than 1 and, as a result, the cost for the central bank of defending the
currency may not exceed the benefit, so that the exchange rate parity may be kept.
3 A Simple Model of Speculative Attacks
on Public Debt
In what follows I present a simple model to show that a similar setting can be
used in order to represent the case of speculative attacks on public debt.5
θ
C(θ , α), B 
B 
C(θ , 0) 
Stable region Unstable region“Gray” region
θ
− θ
−
e + t
−
e(θ, θe)˜ .
e(θ, θe)˜ .
Figure 3: The stable (θ < θ), the unstable (θ ≥θ) and the “gray” (θ ≤ θ < θ) regions.
5 In Della Posta (2016) I consider instead the case of speculative attacks against external debt,
namely both the public and private debt held by foreign residents.
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3.1 Government’s Cost-Benefit Comparison
Let’s consider a “fundamental” variable represented by the public debt/GDP
ratio (b), as taking value between 0 and 1.
The government may default on the public debt if the benefit of doing so
exceeds the cost. The cost of default on the debt, C, is assumed to be the
constant reputation price that the government would pay independently from
the level of the ratio. The benefit, B, instead, increases with b, since the higher
the ratio – namely the weaker the level of the “fundamental” – the more costly
its repayment will be (De Grauwe 2012). If the private sector fully believes in the
stability of public debt (so that nobody is selling government bonds since
nobody anticipates the risk of a debt default, a situation corresponding to a
“good” state of expectations), the point at which the benefit function meets the
cost function identifies the critical level b below which the government will not
default on the debt (in Figure 4 below, the symbol ρg = 0 represents a zero
proportion of speculators attacking the currency with a “good” state of expecta-
tions). The position of the benefit curve, however, is affected by the market
confidence on the stability of b, namely on the state of expectations and the
market’s fear that there may be a default on the debt. As a result, the worse
the state of expectations (namely the higher the market fear and panic), the
more leftward the benefit curve will shift – implying a higher proportion of
0
B(b,ρg = 0)
C
b
B(b , ρdd)
C, B
B(b, ρd)
b*
Figure 4: Government’s comparison between costs and benefits of a default.
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market participation in the attack 6 − and the lower the critical level b*, above
which there will be a default on the debt (in Figure 4 below, ρd indicates the
proportion of speculators attacking public debt when the state of expectations is
“bad”).
In the case of an “extremely bad” state of expectations, in which the whole
market expects a default (ρdd = 1), the benefit of defaulting will exceed the fixed
cost of doing it, no matter how strong (namely how low) the level of the
economic fundamentals is. This is to introduce, then, the possibility that a
speculative attack on public debt may have a self-fulfilling nature and therefore
a multiplicity of stable equilibria (see Figure 4 above, based on the one pre-
sented by De Grauwe 2012).
This is similar to the conclusion reached by Obstfeld (1986) in the different
context of fixed exchange rates. It should be noted, however, that the fear of a
default on public debt (corresponding to a high proportion of speculators
attacking) that induces a leftward shift of the benefit curve, determines an
excess of supply of government bonds, a fall in their price and a higher interest
rate on them which, in turn, weakens the stability condition of public debt,
thereby self-validating the initial fear. This is what will be addressed more in
detail in the following paragraph.
3.2 Speculators’ Decision to Attack Based on Economic
Fundamentals
De Grauwe (2012), limits his analysis to the comparison between costs and
benefits of a default for the government without considering – at least explicitly –
the optimization process of speculators, namely their convenience to attack.
I extend his analysis – referring indirectly to the “fundamentals” approach
initiated by Krugman (1979) – by adding to the point of view of the government
(which compares costs and benefits of a default on public debt), the point of
view of market participants, who will anticipate correctly – if their information
is full and complete and if they form their expectations in a rational way – what
is the critical level of the public debt/GDP ratio above which public debt is not
sustainable anymore and at which, then, they should all start selling the public
bonds that they hold.
6 A situation of panic implies a high proportion of speculators attacking. This occurs because
of strategic complementarities (“I attack just because I fear that all the others will attack”). This
is precisely what characterizes the “beauty contest” example introduced by Keynes in order to
explain why speculation does not necessarily focus on fundamental variables.
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This is obtained by considering the public debt/GDP stability condition7:
db= f − tð Þ+ i− gð Þb ≤ 0 [1]
This means that for all values of b such that eq. [1] is satisfied, the public
debt/GDP ratio is sustainable since it will not explode to infinity in the
future: speculators, then, have no reasons to attack a stable and sustainable
public debt.8
It needs to be further observed that the nominal interest rate, i contains a
risk premium component that increases with b. De Grauwe and Ji, 2013, how-
ever, show that such a risk premium changes depending on the “good” or “bad”
state of expectations and not only on the actual state of fundamentals. When the
state of expectations reflects “good” conditions, the nominal interest rate ig
(where superscript g refers to the “good” state of expectations) can be consid-
ered as given by a linear equation depending on an exogenously given bench-
mark interest rate (i)9 and a debtor’s risk premium. In the case of a “bad” state of
expectations, instead, the nominal interest rate reacts non linearly, and in
particular more than proportionally, to the public debt/GDP ratio than in the
case of “good” expectations, as we will see more in detail below.
In the case of a “good” state of expectations, then, the interest rate is determined
linearly by the value taken by b, depending on the sensitivity parameter α, so that:
7 This is a modified version of the equation proposed by De Grauwe (2014), in which he
considers the overall fiscal deficit, rather than the primary deficit, thereby ignoring the role
played by the interest rate on public debt. More precisely, the equation he considers is:
db=d− gb, where d is the fiscal deficit/GDP ratio and the other symbols are the same as
above. This equation allows him to rationalize the Maastricht criteria, by observing that public
debt would be stabilized (namely db = 0) with a 3% fiscal deficit/GDP ratio and a 60% public
debt/GDP ratio, only if the nominal GDP growth takes a value of 5% (composed by 2% inflation
rate and an optimistic 3% real GDP growth rate).
8 The stability condition reported in equation (1) above can be derived easily by considering
the dynamic equation of public debt:
dB= F −Tð Þ+ iB
where B is the steady state level of public debt, F is constant level of government expenditure, T
is the constant level of taxation – so that (F – T) is the constant primary deficit – and i is the
constant nominal interest rate to service the public debt. From the equation above, by dividing
through by the nominal GDP, thereby considering the public debt/GDP ratio, it follows that:
db= f − tð Þ+ i− gð Þb
(Low case letters refer to the ratio of the respective capital letter with GDP, and g is the constant
rate of growth of nominal GDP).
9 In the euro area context it is not difficult to think of i as the benchmark provided by the
interest rate on German public debt.
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ig =i+ αb [2]
The stability condition for public debt with a “good” state of expectations
becomes, then:
dbg = f − tð Þ+ i+ αb− g b ≤0
If for simplicity we assume that the primary deficit is equal to 0, still considering
the case of a “good” state of expectations, the stability region is included in the
range (0, bg), where bg indicates the value the of the public debt/GDP ratio
below which the stability condition is satisfied and no speculator, therefore, will
sell public debt bonds. Equation db= αb2 − g −i
 
b reaches its minimum at the
level of b = g −
i
2α and has a zero value at points b= b
g = g −
i
α and b =0 (see Figure 5
below corresponding to the case in which g−i > 0).
Figure 5 below also shows both the case of a constant primary surplus and
the case of a constant primary deficit.
In case of a constant primary surplus (f < tÞ the curve shifts downwards and, as
the economic intuition suggests, the stability region (by considering only the
positive solution) gets larger (the new critical level bg′ is larger than bg), since
now the primary surplus makes sustainable even a larger public debt:
bg′ =
g −ið Þ+
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
g −ið Þ2 − 4α f − tð Þ
q
2α > b
g =
g −ið Þ
α
b
Figure 5: Sustainability functions identifying different critical values of b, depending on the
value of the primary deficit/surplus.
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In the case of a primary deficit, instead, the curve shifts upwards and the
stability region gets reduced to the range 0 – bg′′.
In the case of a “bad” state of expectations, the nominal interest rate reacts
more to the public debt/GDP ratio than in the case of “good” expectations. Without
loss of generality, then, we can think of function id (where superscript d refers to
the “bad” state of expectations) as follows:10
id =i+ α
ffiffiffi
b
p
[3]
In the case of eq. [3] above, in which the market revises negatively the risk
premium on public debt, the stability area would get reduced compared to the
case of eq. [2]: while in the case of a linear relationship between interest rate and
public debt, the stability region would be represented by the interval ð0− bg), in
the non-linear case above, characterized by a more than proportional interest rate
sensitivity to b, it would become 0− bd
 
, where bd < bg . Still considering the case
in which the primary deficit/surplus will be equal to 0, then, in a negative state of
expectations, the critical value separating the stable from the unstable region
(ignoring the negative solution) will be bd = ðg −iα Þ2. For plausible values
of ðg −iÞ < α it turns out that bd< bg = g −iα , as clearly shown in Figure 6 below.
b
db
bgdb = 0
bd
Figure 6: Sustainability condition with two different interest rate reaction functions
corresponding to “good” and “bad” states of expectations (in the case of a zero primary
deficit).
10 This is just one of the many possible non-linear equations applying to the case of 0 < b < 1.
Needless to say, for b > 1, the case of a larger interest rate reaction to the public debt/GDP ratio
would be represented by an exponential function of b in which the power is greater than 1.
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What precedes implies that the state of the fundamentals of a country is not
independent of the state of expectations (reflected in the interest rate on public
debt), since a permanent change in the evaluation of the risk premium to be
assigned to public debt, changes the stability condition of the public debt itself.
This explains by itself the fact that countries characterized by similar public
debt/GDP ratios but by a different state of expectations will experience different
situations, some of them being subject to speculative attacks, some not being
attacked.
Needless to say, when information is full and complete and expectations are
taken rationally, the interest rate on public debt should be determined by a
stable relationship with b. Reality however, where “emotional behavior” plays a
role, obliges us to acknowledge that expectations may change even when
fundamentals do not and interest rates reflect those changes.
3.3 Government’s Cost-Benefit Comparison and Speculators’
Optimal Decision Considered Jointly
As we have seen above, in the literature on speculative attacks in fixed exchange
rates, speculative attacks can be self-fulfilling, producing multiple equilibria in
the intermediate region. Something similar happens when considering a specula-
tive attack against public debt: by joining Figure 4 and Figure 5 we obtain a figure
that resembles closely Figure 3 above. As a result, the range of values that can be
taken by b is divided in three regions, as in the case of fixed exchange rates: the
region 0 – b characterized by stability; the region b –1 characterized by instability,
and the intermediate gray area b – b characterized by multiple equilibria.
A worsening of the state of expectations – implying panic and a larger market
participation in the attack – shifts B upwards. However, as we have argued above,
if the revised level of interest rate is expected to be constant in the future, the shift
in expectations (not necessarily justified by a similar shift in the underlying state of
the fundamentals) also affects the public debt sustainability equation through its
effects on the interest rate, thereby reducing the area of stability. As a result, even
a public debt level which would be otherwise stable if not subject to speculative
attacks may turn out to be unsustainable when the state of expectations worsens in
a self-fulfilling way, independently from the state of the fundamentals.
Nominal interest rate i may increase, then, not only because a higher b
implies a higher risk premium on it, but also because the market perception
of risk may increase with the worsening of public debt, thereby modifying
the public debt sustainability equation, and reducing the area of stability. This
is what happened in the euro area, as it will be discussed in Par. 4 below.
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Figures 7 and 8 below represent the three regions (stable, unstable and
“gray”) in the case respectively of a “good” and a “bad” state of expectations.
The case of an “extremely bad” state of expectations (represented in Figure 9
below with superscript dd), in which all market participants join the attack
against public debt, might be characterized by instability even for levels of
public debt which are close to zero. This would be the case if the risk premium
on the nominal interest rate increased to unsustainable levels under the pressure
of a bad state of expectations, independently of the level of public debt. In those
cases, that may represent no more than a theoretical curiosum, the intermediate
region would disappear and the two critical levels of public debt determining
respectively the stable and unstable regions would coincide and would be equal
to 0 (bd = bd = 0).
4 Speculative Attacks on Public Debt and the Euro
Area Crisis
The graphical approach presented above allows to interpret the first years of
EMU and the euro area crisis.
C, B
B(b, ρg )
C
db
g
b
db = 0
Figure 7: Stable (b < bg), unstable (b > bg) and intermediate (b g ≤b ≤ bg) regions with
a “good” state of expectations.
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CB(b,ρ dd)
db = 0
b
db
Figure 9: Fully unstable region with an “extremely bad” state of expectations (ρ = ρdd = 1).
C
B(b, ρd)
d
db
b
Figure 8: Stable (b < bd), unstable (b > bd) and intermediate (bd ≤ b ≤ bdÞ regions with
a “bad” state of expectations.
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It is widely acknowledged that during the first years of life of EMU many
peripheral euro area countries enjoyed a “honeymoon effect”11: financial mar-
kets assigned an overoptimistically low risk premium to their public debt, by
reducing dramatically the interest rate on their government bonds, compared to
the interest rate applied by the markets in the years preceding EMU. By con-
sidering as permanent such a low risk premium, then, the stability region of
those countries became larger.
Things changed when the global financial crisis induced the intervention of
some of the national fiscal authorities belonging to the euro area (Ireland is the
main example), so as to increase their b. When that happened, the “honeymoon
effect” that characterized the first years of EMU came to an end because of a
dramatic change in the state of expectations. As a matter of fact, as already
observed above, De Grauwe and Ji (2013), prove that in the middle of the euro
area crisis the relationship between i and b changed and turned out to be
nonlinear, with the interest rate being affected more than proportionally by
the public debt/GDP ratio.
Data (see Graph 1 below) also show the dramatic change over time of the
interest rate spread of some euro area countries.
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Graph 1: 10-year government bonds interest rate spread of euro area crisis countries vis à vis
Germany.
Source: Elaboration of the author on data from ECB, statistical data warehouse.
11 This is the expression that Krugman (1991) used in order to define the leeway on funda-
mentals enjoyed by a central bank establishing a credible target zone. In future research I may
apply the target zones methodology to investigate further the current problem.
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For both reasons (higher b and higher interest rate spread resulting from a
worsening of the state of expectations), some euro area countries then, moved
from the region of stability 0 – bg of Figure 7 to the potentially unstable region
bd – bd of Figure 8 characterized by multiple equilibria and by the possibility of
self-fulfilling crises.12
Other countries, like for example the US or the UK, were characterized by a
different public debt sustainability equation, reflecting a lower interest rate
sensitivity to b or even a different functional form reflecting a higher credibility
level. The result was that, in spite of a similar pubic debt/GDP ratio (see for
example the UK, compared to Spain (S), or the US compared to the overall euro
area), the interest rates on the US and UK public debt was much lower. This
implies that in the US or the UK the critical levels bUS or bUK separating the
region of stability from the region of multiplicity of equilibria was larger than the
one characterizing some of the euro area countries. In turn, this would explain
why the US and the UK were not subject to speculative attacks in spite of the
equally high public debt/GDP ratios (see Figure 10 below).
During the “honeymoon” days, then, the interest rate function was of a linear
type, reflecting a high confidence in public debt sustainability, and implying
Sustainability 
condition in the 
euro area after 
the crisis
Sustainability 
condition in the US, in 
the UK, and in the 
euro area before the 
crisis
b
db
bd
b
g
b
S= b
UK= b
US
Figure 10: Sustainability conditions in the euro area and in stand alone countries.
12 In the case of Italy and Spain, however, the move to the unstable area occurred even with a
relatively unchanged public debt/GDP ratio.
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a rather large stability region. At the same time, the B-C relationship was
reflecting a high market confidence, so that the region of instability was very
narrow and confined only to extremely high levels of public debt, as shown in
Figure 11 below:
Almost a decade later, in some Eurozone countries, the need to intervene to save
national banks (the most relevant case being Ireland and Spain) or more gen-
erally the need to respond to the difficulties of the global financial and economic
crisis (Portugal, Italy and Greece13), however, changed the situation.
The benefits of default increased dangerously due to the attacks on public
debt resulting from the reduced confidence in its sustainability. In some of the
weaker countries of the euro area the crisis implied, therefore, both a leftward
shift of the B function, and a change in the structure of the interest rate function
(as proved by De Grauwe and Ji 2013 as argued above). As a result, lower critical
levels of both bd and bdobtained (see Figure 12 below).
The public debt/GDP ratio moved then from the stable region (0 – bgÞ of
Figure 11 into the unstable region above the critical level bd of Figure 12. – partly
because it increased, but mainly because of the change of the sustainability
condition – in which a multiplicity of equilibria is possible, depending on the
C
B(b, ρ g = 0)
db
C, B
Figure 11: The “honeymoon” years of EMU.
13 The case of Greece, however, is completely different from the other ones, since it even
implied the cheating on public accounts by a former government.
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state of expectations of the private sector and depending on the presence of
institutions capable to reassure the markets.
What remains to be explained is the reason why the same increases in
public debt or the same economic crisis determined a different evolution in
the state of expectations in countries like the UK or the US on one hand and the
euro area crisis countries on the other hand. One quite relevant difference is that
in the UK or in the US central banks could play the role of lenders of last resort
and reassure the markets, so as to avoid the occurrence of self-fulfilling crises.
The euro area, instead, is characterized by a different institutional set up in
which the Maastricht Treaty forbids explicitly the ECB to play the role of lender of
last resort, in order to avoid the risk of moral hazard by the participating countries.
It is only when this was reversed with the celebrated “whatever it takes”
Draghi speech in the summer of 2012 that market confidence was restored and
the stability region enlarged again.
5 Concluding Remarks
The literature on speculative attacks on fixed exchange rates – that found
application to interpret the 1992–93 EMS crisis – merged two competing expla-
nations (the one based on diverging fundamentals, and the one based on self-
fulfilling attacks) within a single framework, and identified three regions for the
level of fundamentals: the region of stability, in which fundamentals are so
strong that no attack will ever take place; the region of instability, in which
C
B(b, ρd)
dbt
b
Figure 12: The euro area crisis.
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fundamentals are so weak that even if no speculators join in the attack a
devaluation will take place; and an intermediate region in which fundamentals
are neither so strong to rule out the risk of an attack, nor so weak to generate an
attack with certainty.
Within this “gray” region, a multiplicity of equilibria is possible, so that an
attack will take place only if speculators are able to coordinate their actions.
In this paper I argue that the recent attacks on public debt in the euro area
can be interpreted in a similar way.
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